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For many cultures, religion is imperceptibly woven into the fabric of life.
To talk of a transcendent spiritual realm separate from temporal human
strivings for justice and freedom is to embrace an intellectual dualism with
disastrous consequences for both the individual and the community. In
such cultures, religion gives life meaning, gathering experiences into a
frame of understanding without which God's purpose would be unknown.'
To ask individuals in such cultures to privatize their faith or to act on it
only when it has been properly sanitized by secular discourse is to
misunderstand the role and importance of religious devotion.2
Thus, a secular culture that decries or disparages the holistic relationship
between religion and the rest of life is particularly troubling for those who
attempt to take religious devotion seriously, that is, for those who think it
essential to work out the implications of religious faith for one's life and
relationship to others. Steven Carter's most recent book, The Culture of
Disbelief. How American Law and Politics Trivializes Religious Devotion,
1. The way in which religious standards give meaning to life often conflicts with the quest for
meaning carried out by the state and its instrumentalities. For treatments of this conflict, see generally
MICHAEL PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(1991); David Tracy, THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION: CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF
PLURALISM (1981); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HAkV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
2. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988) (elaborating
a theory that admits moral propositions based on religious conviction, but only when justified in secular
terms).
3. According to recent Gallup research, over 80% of all Americans say they pray to God regularly.
Eighty-two percent of those polled describe themselves as Christian (56% Protestant, 25% Roman
Catholic) and 2% as Jewish. See Talking to God, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 6, 1992, at 39.
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is extremely enlightening because it reflects the anxiety and frustration
experienced by many religious believers in a secular world.
Carter provides two overlapping explanations for why contemporary
American culture trivializes religious faith: the first is conceptual and the
second is political. Conceptually, liberalism-given its emphasis on the
rational, empirical, and factual-sees questions of religious faith as a set of
speculative assertions incapable of rational verification or disproof.
Liberalism has, then, a structural bias against religious knowledge. The
empirical orientation of the former has deemed the transempirical faith of
the latter irrational from the start. This raises an important question that is
ultimately left unanswered by Carter's work. What is the compatibility, if
any, between religious and democratic discourses, given the constraints of
liberal ideology? To answer this question one must examine where and why
the conversation between religionists and secularists breaks down and
assess how that breakdown might be repaired.
This inquiry is important because it can facilitate what I like to call
spiritual communication, or a spiritual movement towards understanding.
That is, analyzing what happens when conversations about meaning break
down could bring us into a better understanding of ourselves and others.
Words are never a satisfactory proxy for that understanding which is, at its
core, transrational and transverbal. The focus on communication, however,
can set the conditions for understanding, for allowing the spirit to have its
way. To that end, I suggest that both democrats and religionists cultivate
sensibilities latent in their traditions, sensibilities capable of moving them
beyond the typical sticking points that destroy the possibilities of
understanding, even when reconciliation is unlikely.
The conceptual explanation for the rift between liberalism and religion
is ultimately unsatisfactory. It does not fully explain why religious
justification, "God-talk,." has long been used and accepted in American
political discourse, notwithstanding the theoretical limits of liberalism.
Thus, Carter needs a political explanation as well to account for the more
contemporary trivialization of religious devotion. According to Carter, the
religious right's condemnation of Roe v. Wade4 in 1973 and the subsequent
mobilization against abortion rights frightened many liberals into a
reactionary resistance to religious justifications in public deliberation and
policy.
I argue that the rift between religious and progressive politics originated
in two related historical developments. The first was the disintegration of
the old Civil Rights coalition in the mid-1960s, prompted primarily by an
unwillingness on the part of white liberals to address the unfinished
business of the Black Freedom struggle. The second was the rise of a
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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conservative white backlash that started in the 1950s after Brown v. Board
of Education' in 1954 and was consummated by the election of Ronald
Reagan as president in 1980. This rising reactionary force exploited the
breakdown of the left-liberal coalition. Roe, I argue, was merely a
steppingstone for this conservative white backlash, which struggled at first
but surged to prominence when conservative Republicans joined forces with
conservative white Southerners, many of whom were Christian fundamen-
talists and conservative evangelicals, to support a national platform that was
anti-civil-rights, anticommunism, and anti-civil-disobedience.
The history of the relationship among religion, politics, and civil rights
over the last forty years therefore shows that a rapprochement between
religion and liberalism will require a fresh look at the role of race in the
split between religious and liberal discourse. I conclude that if there is to
be a reunification of progressive politics and religion in particular and a
greater acceptance of religion in public space in general, liberals will have
to recommit themselves to the unfinished business of racial equality.
Disagreement over this issue prompted the splintering of the liberal
coalition that created the political vacuum exploited by the reactionary
forces of the Christian and Republican right.
Thus, my objective in this essay is to explain why both of Carter's
accounts of how American culture has trivialized religious devotion are
incomplete. His explanations do not reach deeply enough either into the
problems and possibilities of liberalism, in the first case, or the history of
the late 1960s and early 1970s, in the second, to be fully accurate. This
essay is an attempt to enhance these accounts and to thereby provide a
more complete account of the causes and cures of the problem with which
Carter grapples.
I. THE CONCEPTUAL LIMIrs OF LIBERALISM
The first problem is that liberalism may have conceptual limits that
prevent it from taking religious conviction seriously. One might argue that
the political theory of liberalism trivializes religious devotion by implying,
in countless subtle and not so subtle ways, that religion is irrational and
dogmatic and thus poses a threat to enlightened democracy. The increasing
secularism of the modem age, founded on a faith in the capacity of human
reason and rooted in empiricism, rejects systems of knowledge grounded
in faith as superstitious nonsense on stilts, unreceptive to human verifica-
tion or disproof. Liberalism marginalizes religious epistemologies,
sequestering them within the narrow confines of private life in the hope
5. 347 U.S. 403 (1954).
19941 437
3
Cook: God-Talk in a Secular World
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1994
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
that the havoc they might engender, if let loose in the public square of
democratic deliberation, will be prevented.6
Even this description does not fully reflect the depth of the crisis.
Religious devotion is not merely marginalized in the public square, but in
private interactions as well. When liberal theory makes "God a hobby" by
relegating the implications of one's most important beliefs to strictly private
affairs, it not only impoverishes public discourse but private discourse as
well. Such a result is unavoidable, since the liberal curse on God-talk
informs the sensibilities of an entire culture. Thus, William F. Buckley, Jr.
has observed that in his experience the first invocation of God at a dinner
party is sufficient to draw undue attention, the second, "sufficient never to
be invited again."7 In such a culture, the person guided by religious faith
is like a house divided against itself, a troubled soul suffused with the
anxiety of repressing his or her identity, someone compelled to wear masks
to escape recognition and disparagement as "one of those religious
fanatics." Carter rightly bemoans this splintering of human consciousness
and identity, but, as I will later argue, mischaracterizes the genesis of its
contemporary development.
Some commentators take issue with Carter's contention that religious
devotion is trivialized and maligned by an alleged culture of disbelief.
Michael Kinsley, in discussing Carter's book in The New Republic, inquires
whether anyone could seriously believe that in America it is easier to be a
public figure and atheist than to be a public figure and religious.' Kinsley
suggests that the so-called "culture of disbelief' would reject in short order
a politician who dared to proclaim his atheism. But this observation utterly
supports Carter's thesis. While public officials invoke God in speeches,
ceremonies, and rituals, the invocation is superficial, more an indication of
good public relations than of serious personal convictions. Such a
superficial use of God, as a nice bow to wrap around the public official's
package of promises, belittles the role of religion all the more. This is safe,
acceptable, and totally useless God-talk that undermines the efforts of those
who see God as more than a pretty bow to tie around their otherwise
secular dialogue and decisions.
Carter laments this development because religion can and should play an
important role in any vibrant democracy. As he sees it, the role of religion
in democracy is to mediate the relationship between the individual and the
state, standing between the two on behalf of the religiously devout,
articulating a vision that reflects the deep convictions of a community of
6. This is particularly troubling in light of recent Gallup polls that cite 96% of Americans as saying
they believe in God. See Talking to God, supra note 3, at 38. See also Ari L. Goldman, Religion Notes,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, at A9.
7. James M. Wall, God as a Hobby-Public Language and Private Belief, CHRISTIAN CENTURY,
Oct. 6, 1993, at 924.
8. Michael Kinsley, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1993, at 4.
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faith-a vision often rightfully in conflict with the vision of the state. Such
conflict and tension lead to the best kind of democracy, one in which
ossified understandings of the common good are perennially challenged and
reshaped by outsiders who apprehend truth differently and who project
different visions of society based on their understandings. Nothing is as
deadly to democracy as the homogeneity of opinion. This is why,
according to Carter, authoritarian communist states make the suppression
of religious liberty their first order of business. Religion troubles
authoritarian leaders because it threatens to disrupt the existing order; its
kingdom is not of this world, and its organizing principles are always ill-at-
ease with the conventions and norms of secular culture. At least this is
ideally the case.
For Carter, the Civil Rights movement provides a notable example of the
kind of cutting-edge and potentially unsettling role religion can
play-requiring us to rethink our positions, demanding political account-
ability, and, most importantly, necessitating a discourse on substantive
values and ends in a culture often too instrumentalist for its own good.
Too often, Carter reminds us, this is not the role religion plays in society.
Far too frequently, religion is uncritical and accommodationist in its
relationship to the state. Carter attributes this accommodationist relation-
ship to two developments in liberalism, one judicial and the other
legislative.
The first development, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First
Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, has failed, on the
whole, to take religious liberty seriously. The upshot of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence is a vindication of the separation of church and self
that is the cornerstone of the culture of disbelief. "The vision of the Free
Exercise Clause as protecting communicative acts rather than acts of
worship or public acts carries with it precisely the message that the
separation of church and self entails: you are free to believe as you like,
but, for goodness sake, don't act on it!"9
For instance, in the 1990 case of Employment Division v. Smith,' the
Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of two state employees who had
violated state law by using a controlled substance, peyote. While the
employees argued that the Free Exercise Clause protected them from
prosecution, because the drug was traditionally used as part of a religious
ritual, the majority of the Court rejected the claim. As long as the state
law was not "an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of
religious beliefs, or the raising of one's children in those beliefs,"" the
9. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZES
RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 130 (1993).
10. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
11. Id. at 882.
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law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The Court engaged here,
according to Carter and other First Amendment scholars, in a crude
reduction of the status of religious practice to that of any other practice,
equally subject to state regulation rationally related to appropriate state
goals. The Court failed to appreciate how, for many religions, worship and
public acts of devotion are indistinguishable from belief, how a Native
American religionist's smoking of peyote is synonymous with a Christian's
taking the sacrament. The religious practice is inseparable from the
religious belief. It would not be satisfactory to tell Catholics, for instance,
that while they were free to believe and communicate to others that the
wine drunk in Holy Communion is the blood of their crucified Lord, that
they were, nonetheless, prohibited from consuming wine as part of the
ritual. A regulation of the behavior in such as case is a regulation of the
belief. Carter would modify the legal standards to provide that "the state,
in trying to enforce a law impinging on the religion's ability to sustain
itself, be required to demonstrate a compelling state interest in enforcing
the questioned statute."' 2 Thus, the state would be required to demon-
strate the importance of its goal and the absence of less intrusive ways of
reaching that goal.
The second development in liberalism that encourages the accommoda-
tionist role of religion is the advent of the modern welfare state. The
welfare state has cast its regulatory net over almost every dimension of
private life, influencing behavior through regulations on tax, bankruptcy,
welfare, health, education, and agriculture. Religion, too, is influenced by
the growth and pervasiveness of regulatory bureaucracy. While Carter sees
the regulatory welfare state as essential to the ordered development of
American society since the turn-of-the-century, he wonders whether the
balance struck between religions and the state might not have unduly
compromised the valuable role religions should play in a democratic
culture.
Carter points out, for instance, how the state's regulation of discrimina-
tion through antidiscrimination laws might conflict with serious religious
beliefs. Suppose a state's human rights law prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sexual preference. A devoutly religious couple renting out an
apartment refuses to rent the apartment to a homosexual couple on the
grounds that their complicity in the sin destines them to Hell. Should
secular law so easily trump religious freedom?
Suppose religious organizers of the St. Patrick's Day parade refuse to
permit gay and lesbian couples to march in the parade. The state refuses
to grant a permit unless the ban is lifted, in order to avoid violating laws
12. CARTER, supra note 9, at 132.
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prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Should
secular law so easily trump religious freedom?
Suppose, finally, a private religious school prohibits, under penalty of
expulsion, interracial dating and marriage on the grounds that it is sin, and
subjects those who sanction it to eternal damnation. In response, the
Internal Revenue Service threatens to take away the school's favored tax
status permitting tax-deductible contributions. Lacking this tax structure
would significantly impede the school's efforts to raise funds. Should
secular law so easily trump religious freedom?
Carter is prepared to say that religious liberty should give way in each
of these cases, but sees the inquiry as decidedly more complex than the
knee-jerk response that welfare state liberalism would provide. That
response is something like the following: if you avail yourself, religious
believer, of public markets and benefits, like it or not you must abide by
our conception of morality. For Carter, the question is one of orientation
and approach. The cavalier attitude that reckons these as easy cases, that
fails to see how a little piece of democracy is lost every time we fail to
take religious devotion seriously, comes back to haunt us in those cases that
should not be easy at all, cases like Smith.
Even if one agrees that the liberal morality of the welfare state should
override the religious liberty claimed in these three illustrations, there is
still the question of how we should think and talk about this process.
Judicial opinions and lay conversations about these issues too often nurture
an atmosphere of utter skepticism that encourages us to see religious ideals
as the antiquated and irrational beliefs of unenlightened drones. Such an
orientation blinds us to those dimensions of religious conviction that tell us
important things about who we are and who we are capable of becoming.
As Carter realizes, however, religious bodies are often the last to decry
such interventions by judicial and legislative liberalism, because they have
been largely co-opted by the largess of the welfare state. Religion has
grown increasingly dependent on the tax-related funding enticements of the
state. Churches and many other intermediate institutions have become
"addicted to government aid,"'13 Carter tells us, through the funding of
government programs and indirectly through a dependency on tax
exemptions and charitable deductions. "But addictions carry costs, not the
least of which is the sad fact that, in the end, the supplier always controls
the addict-something to ponder, surely, as one contemplates how to avoid
the trivialization of religious faith in America."' 4 The Faustian deal struck
between religion and the state is religion's willingness to abide by the
secular standards and expectations of the state in exchange for favored tax
13. Id. at 152.
14. Id.
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status, treatment, and access to government largess. Thus, when religions
complain of laws that do not regulate on the basis of religious beliefs but
that seriously challenge and, many times, undermine those beliefs, the cry
falls on deaf ears. The tragedy of the Faustian deal, Carter points out, is
that "when one makes a deal with the devil, one must be prepared to hold
up one's end when the debt comes due." 15
Liberalism has thus played the role of cultural imperialist. Waving the
banner of value neutrality, it has imposed, through judicial and legislative
coercion, its own set of values on religious communities whose value
systems are often informed by different traditions and experiences. Why
is the value system embraced by the liberal state superior to that embraced
by the various communities outside the state? The first step in remedying
the conceptual limits of liberalism must be an admission that liberalism is
a value system competing against other, equally plausible attempts to give
life meaning. The second step is to work out a set of sensibilities that
enhance the possibility that competing conceptions of community, that is,
competing value systems, can communicate, modulate, and collaborate on
the collective construction of social order.
A. The God of Liberalism
How do we get around the dilemma posed by the conceptual limits of
liberalism? The first strategy is to deconstruct the false liberal dichotomies
that deem the values of religious faith irrational and outside the boundaries
of the objectively superior values of liberal rationalism. In other words,
liberalism must be exposed as but a different kind of religion, with its own
presuppositions of faith, presuppositions that are themselves incapable of
the kinds of empirical verifications required of competing value systems.
If liberalism is seen as a different kind of religious faith, the inherent bias
against religion is destroyed, because to sustain it would undermine the
civic religion of liberal culture as well. In this way we can establish a
conceptual bulwark against the trivialization of religious faith and devotion.
How, then, can we describe liberalism in religious terms?
Liberalism conceives of the individual as its own god, an autonomous
rational being pursuing its own conception of the good rather than some
presupposed common good reflecting the will of a transcendent God. At
a theoretical level, then, liberalism holds that there is no common good,
only individual goods. Yet, if there is no objective common good
commanded by God, how does one objectively and neutrally arbitrate the
conflicts that arise from competing conceptions of the good?
A central function of the conception of God for any community of
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permitted to flourish. The religious limits establish the outer boundaries of
acceptable community, prohibiting certain forms of behavior and modes of
interaction as sinful and contrary to the will of God. Whenever there is a
conflict between the desires of believers, the conflict is arbitrated by the
community's conception of God's will, understood through its sacred
scriptures, spiritual intermediaries, and religious literature. Understood as
such, liberalism does not so much reject the need for a conception of God
as it does replace the God of religion with its own conception. For
liberalism, the arbiter of clashing desires is human reason rather than God's
will. Human reason, however, only has instrumental capacity. That is, it
is no more than a tool for elaborating our value commitments. It might
permit us to explain the implications of certain values or conceptions of the
Good, but it cannot determine what that Good should be.
For example, when Hobbes and Locke deduced their classical concep-
tions of the liberal community from the individual's natural right of self-
preservation and the natural right to accumulate private property, reason did
not command them to focus on these attributes of human nature to the
exclusion of others. That was a value-laden and political choice. Had they
selected different attributes of human nature, they undoubtedly could have
deduced extraordinarily different conceptions of liberal community. Indeed,
they could have deduced different conceptions of the liberal community
from the attributes they did choose.
Hobbes and Locke were struggling with questions that were fundamen-
tally religious-what is the essence of human existence? What gives life
meaning? Reason cannot provide answers to these questions, only a belief
system that is willing to take certain leaps of faith can do that. The
question of why we as humans should value some things like self-
preservation and the accumulation of property more than others is
ultimately left unanswered by liberalism's glorification of reason as an
arbiter of clashing desires. Yet even contemporary liberalism, having
travelled great distances since the theories of Hobbes and Locke, takes that
leap of faith by valuing certain visions of community and certain ways of
living over others, often reversing the will of majorities in order to sustain
its own conception of the Good. In other words, despite its theoretical
protestations, liberalism is not a relativist philosophy that accepts all
conceptions of community as equally viable. It clearly values the
autonomy of the individual and all that that is thought to entail for the
individual's political and civil liberties, as well as the resulting distributions
of power and wealth in society.
Within the contemporary American context, for example, the relativist
impulses of liberalism are hidden beneath the sacred scriptures of the
American Constitution, the spiritual intermediaries of judges, and the
religious literature of constitutional decisions. In a sense these become the
ultimate arbiters of conflicting desires among those in the secular
Cook
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community, just as God's will is the ultimate arbiter for those in religious
communities. The institutionalized reason of contemporary liberalism
becomes its own God, transcending the mundane clashes of subjective
desires as it points the way to enlightenment and truth.
Deconstruction demystifies the liberal faith, however, exposing its
vulnerability to the same critique it makes of more traditional forms of
religious faith. The sacred scripture, the Constitution, is indeterminate.
The spiritual intermediaries, judges, are tainted by personal bias, and the
body of religious literature, constitutional decisions, protects the status quo.
Deconstructing the liberal faith is not an argument for rejecting it.
Deconstruction permits us to see liberalism as but another way of
understanding the world, an understanding that like other faiths has its own
conception of God that imposes a set of limits on human behavior through
its sacred scriptures, spiritual intermediaries, and religious literature. The
hope is that by deflating liberalism of its pretensions of superiority to
religious discourse, the playing field is levelled and the way prepared for
a more genuine dialogue between these competing attempts to discern life's
purpose and to imbue our lives with meaning.
B. God-Talk in a Secular Culture
Because religious faith is belittled as irrational dogma that must be
suppressed by reason, when it does surface, either on the political left or
right, it too often speaks with the resentment and hostility engendered by
repression and disrespect. The voice is often caustic, uncompromising, and
conclusory-a self-fulfilling prophecy of its liberal caricature. In this
environment politicians on the left and right, pandering to the repressed
hostility and hopes of believers, all too frequently rush to "turn God into
a supporter, and with the connivance of religious leaders contribute to the
further trivialization of religion"'16 as a legitimate way of knowing the
world, of reflecting on, reckoning with, and responding to problems of
public concern.
Given the dynamics of liberalism's treatment of religion, we might
plausibly inquire whether there is too much historical baggage to ever work
out a satisfying relationship between religionists and secularists. While the
argument exposing the God of liberalism might answer the theoretical
question of incompatibility, the practical question is still very much
informed by the realities of history. In a practical sense, then, is God-talk
incompatible with democratic discourse? When the believer's answer to
why the policy or vision he supports should be preferred over the
competing visions of others is because God commands it, most would say
there is little room for dialogue. I believe that this is the response, whether
16. Id. at 16.
[Vol. 6: 435
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real or imagined, that most skeptics hear religionists making to the complex
problems of democratic governance. If there is any hope for mutual
appreciation and substantive dialogue, this hurdle must be cleared. I will
argue that it can only be cleared by cultivating certain sensibilities-in both
the believer and the skeptic, the religionist and the democrat-that focus
our attention on how different interpretive communities answer the
primordial call to give life meaning.1
7
Let us imagine a conversation between a Christian who strongly believes
that abortion is sinful, that Roe was immoral, and that abortion should be
prohibited, and a skeptic of religion who is just as convinced that abortion
should be protected as a fundamental element of personal freedom.
"Why do you favor the prohibition of abortion?" the skeptic inquires of
the Christian.
"Because," the Christian replies, "abortion is against the will of God."
What happens next is crucial to the prospects of religious discourse in
a secular culture. If our skeptic recoils at this point, repulsed by the
invocation of God, perhaps because she sees it as a dogmatic conclusion
that can never be defeated or altered, the conversation is over. But if the
skeptic refuses to be saddled with the preconceived notions of the
irrationality of God-talk and the uncrossable chasm between religious and
secular epistemologies, there is hope for the dialogue. Rejecting the
temptation to dismiss the religionist's vision because she does not believe
in the existence of a God whose will we can definitively know, the skeptic
ventures yet another inquiry, "How do you know abortion is contrary to the
will of God?"
Now the burden shifts to the believer. If the believer gives in to the
temptation to dismiss the skeptic as a lost soul blind to the truth of God,
the conversation may be over, or, if continued, proceed with a tone and
temper that negates the possibility of understanding and modulation. "I
know abortion to be contrary to the will of God," the Christian responds,
"because God has revealed through Holy Scripture that the taking of
innocent life is murder. He has commanded 'Thou shall not kill,' and thus
to support abortion is to be in complicity with the murder of over a million
humans a year, a crime against God and humanity."
"But certainly," our skeptic responds, "even if I agree with you, just for
the sake of the argument, that an unborn fetus is human life, that, indeed,
human life begins at conception, surely not all taking of life is contrary to
17. For discussions of the compatibility of religious discourse in a liberal democracy, see RICHARD
J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMocRAcY IN AMERICA (1984); Frederick
M. Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671 (1992); Sanford Levinson,
Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2061 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Religion and Liberal Democracy, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 175 (1992).
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God's will. What of war, capital punishment, and self-defense, all
condoned by God in your scriptures?"
At this point the conversation runs the risk of turning into an exercise in
biblical hermeneutics. The believer attempts to distinguish, scripturally, the
cases given by the skeptic from the case of abortion, or defends an
understanding of God's will that deems all such cases contrary to God's
will and, more or less, equally problematic. Such a conversation is
sometimes liberating, fostering a greater degree of understanding. But too
often it deteriorates into an analytic and legalistic exercise that further
alienates the two interlocutors and widens the chasm separating their
divergent conceptions of truth.
What is needed here is an orientation, a predisposition, a set of
sensibilities capable of enhancing the possibility of those moments when
we see into the soul of another and, to our surprise, see ourselves, not as
we imagine ourselves to be but as we really are-finite creatures yearning
and struggling to give life meaning. These sensibilities become the means
through which spirit speaks to spirit, the means through which disparate
experiences and understandings are translated into the language of others.
Not that the right sensibilities will produce consensus on such issues as
abortion, but the cultivation of such sensibilities creates different people in
the process and different possibilities for us all.
As finite creatures in search of meaning, we find or create our
God(s)-the values in our lives that we accept-consciously or uncon-
sciously, as fundamental. These values provide the first principle, the
uncaused Cause accepted as an article of faith beyond which there is no
need of justification, from which the interpretive enterprise is launched and
to which it returns. This is no less true of the skeptic than of the believer,
and if both could but realize it, God-talk and democracy would find many
convergences indeed.
Realizing, then, that both are working with a conception of God and are
engaged in a hermeneutic quest for meaning, the skeptic and the believer
might see in each other's positions meaning to which they were previously
blind or, at least, unreceptive. The skeptic might acquire a new apprecia-
tion for the spiritual implications of a decision to have an abortion for both
the woman and the society that approves it. A thoughtful and feeling
skeptic might very well continue to support a woman's right to have an
abortion, but with the stipulation that she first participate in some form of
counselling. If this makes a difficult situation more difficult, that is the
objective, for it helps assure that the decision is a spiritual struggle filled
with the kind of angst characteristic of tragic choices.
On the other hand, the believer might develop a greater appreciation for
the tragedy of certain choices, how individuals often find themselves in
situations not of their own making, hurled into the maelstrom of life by the
caustic winds of poverty and despair. Thus, while the believer may
[Vol. 6: 435
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continue to support the legal prohibition of abortion, she may become even
more committed to the elimination of the poverty and despair that often
necessitate such tragic choices and to the amelioration of the consequences
of the choice itself through financial assistance and adoption. The concern
for unborn life might expand into a concern for life in general that provides
greater common ground between the believer and the skeptic, if not on this
issue, then on others.
The particular believer and skeptic I have envisioned here are constructed
by the narrative in a particular way. They can, of course, be constructed
differently. The important point is not whether the believer is pro-life or
pro-choice or whether the skeptic is pro-choice or pro-life; either combina-
tion is plausible, and many different variations on the combination are
possible. The important point is that we can envision scenarios in which
God-talk and democratic talk are not only compatible with but essential to
each other. Indeed, not only is it possible to talk, but, when that talk is
informed by certain sensibilities, it is possible to modulate one's position
as well, actually learning from the voice once heard only as a foreign
tongue.
The possibilities for democratic and religious discourse, thus, hinge on
the development of a spiritual orientation that is often missing in religious
and secular discourses. This spirituality is, fundamentally, an admission of
our finiteness as human creatures. For democratic secularists it is an
admission of the limits of rationality. For democratic religionists it is an
admission of our alienation from God and of our sinfulness as fallen
creatures redeemed by grace. The awareness of our finitude fosters a
temperament of humility that often takes us beyond our self-imposed
limitations to grasp understanding previously denied us by the arrogance of
our self-contained worlds. Movement and change will not always result,
nor should they, but different people are created in the process. That, we
should remember, is not for naught.
As Carter points out, however, God-talk was not always so foreign to the
ear of American liberals. There is a long tradition of left-liberal politics
and religion dating back to the abolitionists and progressing through the
New Deal and Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. The liberals
that supported civil rights for Blacks certainly did not find religious
discourse antithetical to the ends of democracy. The chasm between left-
liberals and the religious community that seems so natural now is, Carter
reminds us, of recent vintage. Thus, Carter provides us with a second
explanation, a political one, for why the trivialization of religious devotion
in American culture has occurred at this historical juncture.
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II. THE IMPACT OF ROE V. WADE ON POLITICS AND RELIGION
"What is going on here in America," Carter asks, "where religion was
once thought to be so important that the Constitution was amended to
protect its free exercise?"' 8 His answer-abortion. "In 1973," Carter tells
us, "the Supreme Court decided in Roe that the right to privacy was broad
enough to encompass a pregnant woman's decision on whether to carry the
pregnancy to term."' 9 The decision was like "a cold shower" for many
religious conservatives, awakening them to a renewed commitment to civic
responsibility:
Christian fundamentalists who had preached for decades that their
followers should ignore the secular world, perhaps not even vote,
looked around and decided that the secular world was on the verge of
destroying the tight religious cocoons in which they had bound their
communities.... And so the public rhetoric of religion, which from
the time of the abolitionist movement through the era of the "social
gospel" and well into the 1960s and early 1970s had largely been the
property of liberalism, was all at once-and quite thunderously,
too-the special province of people fighting for a cause that the left
considered an affront. Since the 1970s, liberals have been shedding
religious rhetoric like a useless second skin, while conservatives have
been turning it to one issue after another, so that by the time of the
1992 Republican Convention, one had the eerie sense that the right
was asserting ownership in God-but that the left had yielded its
rights.2°
I want to argue that Carter is correct to focus our attention on the impact
of Roe; it truly was an important factor in the mobilization of the Christian
right. Perhaps it was even the proverbial straw that broke the camel's
back. But the shift of which Carter writes actually has its roots in a more
fundamental schism created by the conservative white backlash against the
gains of the Civil Rights era and the concomitant splintering of the Civil
Rights coalition in the mid-1960s. I contend that the hostility engendered
by the Civil Rights movement among white Southern fundamentalists and
political conservatives around the country needed an acceptable political
conduit through which to vent its anger and frustration.
That political conduit was not sufficiently in place to elect Barry
Goldwater in 1964, but was by the time Richard Nixon won the White
House in 1968. The conservative backlash reached its heights when Ronald
Reagan was elected in 1980 and when the political mouthpiece of the
Christian right, the Moral Majority, challenged and defeated a long list of
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senators, congressmen, and state officials in 1984. Roe was a mere rallying
point in this wave of counterrevolutionary resistance, a refueling station on
the new conservative coalition's march to power. This political conduit
was the result of the skillful shaping of a new Republican party that
brought together political and religious conservatives in the South and,
ultimately, throughout the country. This is an important point, because if
the rise of the religious right to power is rooted in the splintering of the old
Civil Rights coalition and the conservative white backlash to the
movement's achievements, any successful rapprochement between left-
liberals and religionists would have to take this history into account. The
implications are, as we shall see, quite serious for the future direction of
left-liberal politics in America.
A. The Splintering of the Liberal Coalition
My basic argument is that when the liberal Civil Rights coalition
splintered in the mid-1960s, the political/moral vacuum it left in its wake
was filled by powerful and savvy counterrevolutionary forces. These forces
were energized by Roe, to be sure, just as they had been energized by the
1962 decision of Engel v. Vitale,21 which held unconstitutional the
recitation of school prayers. But the shaping and channeling of these forces
had long been underway.
22
Roe cannot fully explain the shift in religious rhetoric from left to right
for one simple reason: religious justifications of the decision were readily
available to liberals in the abortion debate. 23 The left had always compet-
ed against the right for divine sanction. Why did they cave in on this
issue? During the abolitionist movement, for example, there were
conservative religionists who believed and acted on the premise that slavery
was a divinely ordained institution.24 This did not deter the left from
constructing its own religious justifications. During the period of the anti-
lynching crusade and the social gospel, there was no shortage of conserva-
tive clergy who saw God as a political conservative mandating believers to
21. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
22. For a thorough history of the development of the liberal consensus and its dissipation, see
GODFREY HODGSON, AMERICA IN OUR TIME: FROM WORLD WAR II TO NIXON-WHAT HAPPENED AND
WHY 67 (1978).
23. See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993); ELIZABETH MENSCH AND ALAN FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF
VIRTUE: IS ABORTION DEBATABLE? (1993); ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE STRUGGLE FOR AMERICA'S SOUL:
EVANGELICALS, LIBERALS, AND SECULARISM (1989).
24. For a more complete account of how the slaveowners used religion to justify slavery, see
Stanley Morrison, The Religious Defense of American Slavery Before 1830, 1980-81 J. RELIGIOUS
THOUGHT, Fall-Winter, at 16; KENNETH STAMPP, To MAKE THEM STAND IN FEAR: IN THE BLACK
CHURCH IN AMERICA 54 (1971). See also ANNE LOVELAND, SOUTHERN EVANGELICALS AND THE
SOUTHERN ORDER 1800-1860, at 202-03 (1980) (Noting that evangelicals argued that because "slavery
was not a sin [according to the Word of God], the church had no reason to take cognizance of it, and
since it was established and protected by civil law, the church had no right to interfere with it.").
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embrace the political and economic ideologies of states' rights and laissez-
faire. z5 Nevertheless, many on the left continued to stamp their progressive
and radical programs with the blessings of God. Finally, during the 1960s,
King battled conservative and liberal clergy who joined in the chorus of
detractors contending that his campaign of nonviolent direct action was
either against God's will altogether or at least untimely.26  This did not
dissuade King, however, as his letter from the Birmingham jail makes clear.
No, something else has to account for why liberals did not construct a
religious justification to counter the right's religious condemnation of Roe.
The answer becomes more apparent when we realize that the liberal
coalition of the Civil Rights movement consisted of a precarious alliance
of Blacks, Jewish and Christian progressives, and the progressive wings of
labor, white women's groups, young white college students, and intellectu-
als. After the victory of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, all of these groups
were posing the pressing question, "Where Do We Go From Here?"
27
The answer was not apparent, and even some Blacks in the Movement,
considering the era of protest over, looked to ordinary electoral politics for
the answer.28 Meanwhile, other answers were offered: white students had
joined the antiwar protests on their college campuses; white women had
become increasingly absorbed by a women's movement that would be
catapulted to new heights by the pro-woman decision of Roe; workers were
concerned about job security in an economy of highly mobile multinational
corporations; Jewish leaders had turned inward, fearful of the implications
25. See Louis GASPER, THE FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT (1963). Gasper discusses the
relationship between the influence of Calvinist theology on Southern fundamentalism and the laissez-
faire conception of politics and economy so prevalent throughout the region: Calvin's ideals for all
Christians were "thrift, industry and sobriety, which permitted men to prosper economically without fear
of being regarded as tainted by the sin of avarice." Id. at 4.
26. One white clergyman admonished King for his "untimely" Birmingham demonstrations by
pointing out that "all Christians know that the colored people will receive equal rights eventually, but
it is possible that you are in too great of a religious hurry. It has taken Christianity almost two
thousand years to accomplish what it has. The teachings of Christ take time to come to earth." Martin
Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail (1963), reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (James M. Washington ed., 1986).
27. The splintering of the liberal consensus in the mid-sixties resulted from several factors,
including the disaffection of white liberals from the movement as the campaign shifted its focus to
class-based oppression in the North; the radicalization of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Commit-
tee (SNCC) and its adoption of a more militant stance calling for Black Power; the shift in the federal
government's attention from the domestic problems of race relations and the war on poverty to cold war
concerns; the mounting white backlash against what appeared to be rapid Black gains; and finally, the
belief among many of King's own associates that with the attainment of the franchise in 1965, use of
the democratic processes of the political system would secure the balance of the Movement's agenda.
See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 761-62 (1977); FRANCES PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, POOR
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 252-55 (1979).
The split within the African-American ranks of the movement over the viability of nonviolence as
a strategy was of major importance. See LOUIS LOMAX, THE NEGRO REVOLT 246-47 (1962) (warning
of impending violence unless whites responded to African-American demands for reform); PIvEN &
CLOWARD, supra, at 248 (describing Black masses joining the protest by rioting in the ghettos of
several major cities).
28. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNrrY? (1969).
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for their own struggles of the race-conscious rhetoric of the young militant
Black groups; intellectuals had returned to their universities to write their
histories, thereby certifying the Movement's Dead on Arrival status in
1965. In other words, the liberal Civil Rights coalition was fracturing, even
disintegrating, and in its weakened state stood little chance of surviving the
conservative forces preparing to take it by storm. By 1973 the coalition
was truly dead. There was no response from the left, because there was no
cohesive left to respond.
One might argue, in other words, that the liberal coalition reached its
philosophical limits with the signing of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. The
left-liberal coalition was held together by a core belief that Blacks should
be, as King captured it in his most revered public address, "judged not by
the color of their skin, but by the content of their character."2 9 In other
words, most whites, and many Blacks, saw the Movement as a means of
securing the formal rights of equality for Blacks, their right to be treated
like anyone else in the American democracy.3 °
Thus, when on August 6, 1965 President Johnson signed the Voting
Rights Act into law, many thought they had witnessed the culmination of
a second Reconstruction. It had started in 1954 with Brown, a case which
tacitly repudiated the fundamental assumption that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment abolition of slavery had meant little, had continued through the 1964
Civil Rights legislation that restored Black citizenship rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and was thought to be complete when Congress
passed a law restoring Black voting rights under the Fifteenth Amendment.
What more was there to be done? At least formally, Blacks had all the
rights of whites. Wasn't the agenda complete? Wasn't that all they
wanted?
3'
"No!" came the defiant answer of Blacks in Watts, Los Angeles, five
days after the signing of the Act. The uprising left 35 dead, 28 of whom
were Black. Invariably, many whites in the coalition found this reaction
difficult to understand. Some were confused and others intimidated by the
subsequent cries of Blacks who claimed unfinished business. Still others
rejected the cries on the grounds that Blacks were being unreasonable and
should channel their grievances through the proper political channels to
which they now all had access. 32 The response failed to account for the
29. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963) reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE,
supra note 26, at 219.
30. For an excellent discussion of the limits of liberalism in addressing issues of racial domination,
see Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuKE L.J. 758-83.
31. For an extensive historical treatment of the legal dimensions of the Second Reconstruction, see
CARL M. BROWN, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE SEcoND RECONSTRUCTION (1977); KLUGER, supra note
27.
32. A newspaper column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, one week after the Watts uprising
put the problem this way: "The implied message of the Moynihan report is that ending discrimination
is not nearly enough for the negro. But what is enough? The phrase 'preferential treatment' implies
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one thing that Blacks in Watts who had always had the right to vote knew
all too well-the right to vote did not necessarily include the right to be
heard or the right to power and control.
King, of course, never thought that the attainment of formal rights was
the end of the struggle.33 He properly understood formal liberal rights as
an important step towards America's socio-economic restructuring and
spiritual regeneration. To that end, in February of 1966, he rented an
apartment in a Black ghetto of Chicago to draw attention to the nature of
this unfinished business, and, in May of that year, he protested against
America's involvement in Vietnam at a large antiwar rally in Washington
D.C. This shift to a multiple front strategy represented King's attempt to
answer the nagging question, "Where do we go from here?" His answer
was to link the struggle against the evils of racism, symbolized by the Civil
Rights movement, to the struggle against the evils of classism, symbolized
by his move into a Chicago slum, to the struggle against military
imperialism, symbolized by his increasing militancy against the Johnson
Administration's war in Vietnam. 4 This was a brilliant political move.
Had it worked, it would have brought back into one fold students in the
antiwar movement, white workers in the labor movement, moderate Blacks
in voter registration movements, and radical Blacks in various forms of
Black nationalist movements.
Why did King's vision of a new coalition not work? One is tempted to
state the obvious. It did not have time to work, given the brevity of his
life. I believe this accounts for much of the answer. If anybody in
American history could have pulled it off, it was King and the Black
Church that supported him.35 Given his untimely assassination, this is, of
course, quite speculative. There are arguments on the other side,
particularly given the increasing ability of conservatives to discredit
progressive leadership through smear campaigns. Indeed, Hoover had
a solution far afield from the American dream. The white majority would never accept it." HODGSON,
supra note 22, at 267.
33. If King ever saw the achievement of formal rights as the end of his struggle, he did not see it
this way for long. The realities of de facto segregation and the countless permutations of systematic
disempowerment made it clear that the subordination of African-Americans was inextricably connected
to the American class structure. Thus, true liberation was inseparable from a fundamental redistribution
of wealth and power-inseparable, that is, from a sustained social struggle to transform the very
foundations of the American capitalist system.
34. For King's analysis of these three evils, see Martin Luther King, Jr., The Three Evils of
Society, Speech at the New Politics Convention (Aug. 31, 1967), at 7.
35. For a reading of the influence of the Black Church on King's vision, see Lewis Baldwin,
Martin Luther King, Jr., The Black Church and the Black Messianic Vision, in 1 MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER, THEOLOGIAN, ORATOR (David Garrow ed., 1989). Baldwin observes:
It was King's conviction that what black people have to offer this country and the world in terms
of values and a worldview is grounded in their experience of suffering-a fresh and genuine
spirituality, humanitarian spirit, a prophetic vision of democracy, an incurable optimism, and a
way of viewing humanity as a whole.
Id. at 15.
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launched the first stage of such a campaign-the selective leaking of
surveillance information-before King's assassination.
36
The more immediate answer to why the new coalition did not congeal
is found in the events of late-1966 and early-1967. In June of 1966 James
Meredith was shot soon after he began his 220-mile "March Against Fear"
from Memphis, Tennessee to Jackson, Mississippi. King, the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and other segments of the interracial
coalition decided to resume Meredith's march. Near Greenwood,
Mississippi, SNCC leaders Stokely Carmichael and Willie Ricks used the
slogan "Black Power" for the first time in public, in the presence of
reporters who made it front page news the next day.37
The controversy between King and SNCC represented some fundamental
differences in the Movement's ideology and programmatic objectives.38
Black Power raised questions about whether the nonviolent commitment of
the SCLC-dominated Movement was justified in an atmosphere fraught
with violence against Blacks, a dilemma whose stark reality was typified
by the assassination of Medgar Evers and current reports of snipers lying
in wait for marchers on their way to Jackson.
Black Power advocates raised unsettling questions about the role of
whites in the Movement, contending that white liberal funding and activism
had co-opted much of the Movement's potential to bring about real shifts
in political and economic power for Blacks. Many in SNCC found it
impossible to continue to preach a gospel of nonviolence and racial
harmony. They had been, for too long, on the front line of the white
South's violence, suffering the pain of cattle prods and other abuses in
Southern jails during the Freedom Rides, and bearing the burden of verbal
and physical abuse during the early sit-ins.39  Their bruised bodies and
heavy hearts now resonated to a different beat-Black Power-the only
36. See DAVID GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTHERN
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 475-527 (1988).
37. For an explanation of the meaning of Black Power and SNCC's involvement with the Black
Power Movement, see Charles Hamilton, Black Power: An Alternative, in SEVEN ON BLACK:
REFLECTIONS ON THE NEGRO EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 134 (William G. Shade & Roy C. Harrenkohl
eds., 1969). A great deal of attention was given to the leadership of Black college students who shifted
the emphasis of the movement from civil rights to individual dignity. See LOMAX, supra note 27, at
42-43 (referring to the psychological "dues" all Blacks pay for being black). For a detailed discussion
of the history of the Civil Rights movement and the role of SNCC and Black college students, see SETH
CAGIN & PHILIP DRAY, WE ARE NOT AFRAID (1988).
38. See Anthony E. Cook, Reflections on Postmodernism, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 751, 766-82
(1992).
39. CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960s
(1981); HOWARD ZINN, SNCC: THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS (1965).
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thing they could see as effectively battling White Power in White America.40
. The rebellions of 1967 sent a clear and unequivocal message that, at least
as far as many Blacks in urban areas were concerned, the social-justice
agenda was not completed by the signing of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
Twenty-three deaths and 725 injuries in Newark, New Jersey on July 12-17
and 43 deaths and 324 injuries in Detroit, Michigan on July 23-30 sent that
message. There were other uprisings as well in 1967 that seemed to carry
the same message: Jackson State, Mississippi on May 10; the Roxbury
district of Boston, Massachusetts on June 2; Tampa, Florida on June 11;
Cincinnati, Ohio on June 12; Buffalo, New York on June 27; Cairo, Illinois
on July 17; Durham, North Carolina on July 19; Memphis, Tennessee on
July 20; Cambridge, Maryland on July 24; and Milwaukee, Wisconsin on
July 30. According to a report of the Senate Permanent Investigating
Committee, there were 75 major uprisings in 1967, killing 83 people,
compared to 36 killed in uprisings in 1965 and 11 in 1966.4' The
Republican candidate, Richard Nixon, was elected president the following
year in 1968 on a platform which promised, among other things, to restore
law and order to America.
The frustrations and anxieties vented during these uprisings prompted
Congressional investigation. In February of 1968 the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorder (the Kerner Commission) said that white
racism was the primary cause of the riots in American cities. In prophetic
language not unlike Daniel of the Old Testament, who prophesied against
Babylonian exploitation and corruption, the Commission read the
handwriting on the American wall. The message was clear: America was
"moving toward two societies, one Black, one white-separate and
unequal.42 Four days later in Washington D.C., King announced plans
for the Poor People's Campaign, a multiracial movement designed to
engage in massive civil disobedience to demand jobs and income for all
poor people. Meanwhile, the more radical H. Rap Brown had replaced
Stokely Carmichael as chairman of SNCC and was developing alternative
understandings of the events of 1967. The remedy was couched in race-
conscious language and focused on the attainment of Black Power,
increasingly defined in separatist terms that called for independent political,
economic, and cultural self-determination for Blacks.
The understandable anger and justifiable rage that carried the cry of
Black Power to white ears was misunderstood, even resented, by many
40. Black Power was understood differently by different groups using the term. For helpful
evaluations of the term, see STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE
POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA (1967); EDWARD PEEKS, THE LONG STRUGGLE FOR BLACK
POWER (1971); THE RHETORIC OF BLACK POWER (Robert Scott & Wayne Brockriede eds., 1969).
41. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).
42. Id. at 236-50.
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liberal allies in the Movement.43 King's genius was that he understood
these dynamics and tried, with great love and dexterity, to mediate the rift
between Black Power advocates and others in order to hold together his
coalition." The Poor People's Campaign that King spearheaded in 1968
was a last ditch effort at accomplishing this realignment. As I stated
earlier, this was part of a larger design to galvanize a broadly based,
multiracial coalition against the triple evils of racism, classism, and
imperialism. But King was assassinated before his labor could bear fruit,
and his death set off a wave of Black unrest in inner cities that brought the
era of the Black-led movement for social justice to an end. The coalition
that appeared dead in 1965 certainly died in 1968 with the assassination of
the one person on the American scene whose vision, determination, and
charismatic genius might have resuscitated it and saved it from its demise.
Finally, the liberal left was in no position to present a religious counter
to the Christian right when Roe was decided, primarily, because the liberal
left was in a state of utter disarray. Its ideological cohesiveness was
dissipated and its politics splintered by the three interrelated dynamics
discussed above. First, many believed that the Movement's struggle for
Black equality before the law had been won and that liberalism had
delivered its promise. They were prepared to go no further for Blacks.
Second, groups comprising the coalition turned inward to their own
concerns and became absorbed by their own separate causes. Finally, the
Black Power movement and violent uprisings throughout the North and
West, confused, intimidated, and repulsed many onlookers, creating ever-
deepening rifts among former Movement supporters. King attempted to
bridge these chasms at the end of his life, but had he lived, they might
have proved too formidable even for a man of his temperament and vision.
B. The New Conservative Coalition
I want to argue here that the conservative and counterrevolutionary
forces that filled the vacuum created by the disintegration of the liberal
coalition were in play and flexing their political muscle long before the
43. In a poll of whites who were asked what the term "Black Power" meant to them, the vast
majority of whites stated that it meant "Black rules white" while 65% of Blacks said the words meant
"nothing" or "a fair share for Black people" or "racial unity." See Joel D. Aberbach & Jack L. Walker,
The Meanings of Black Power: A Comparison of White and Black Interpretations of a Political Slogan,
64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367, 370 (1970).
For examples of the reaction to Black Power, see Martin Duberman, Black Power in America, 1968
PARTISAN REV., Winter, at 34 (contending that the dangers of Black racism in Black Power are real and
not the frightened response of white liberals) and Peter Feldman, How the Cry for Black Power Began,
13 DISSENT 472 (1966) (suggesting that those using the term Black Power were engaging in reverse
racism and planned to engage in racial war).
44. See KING, supra note 28.
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1973 decision of Roe.45 More importantly, the same political and cultural
developments that precipitated the disintegration of the liberal coalition
provided favorable conditions for the rise of the new conservative coalition.
When the liberal coalition was divided over the issues of America's
involvement in Vietnam, urban unrest, and allegations of continued racism,
conservative Christians and Republicans showed great unity. Playing off
each other in impromptu fashion, conservative Christians and Republicans
eventually harmonized on certain themes. The tune was anti-Black, anti-
civil-rights, anti-Jewish, anti-women's-rights, anti-student-protest, and anti-
intellectual. It was the anti-Black/anti-civil-rights chord, however, that
resonated most powerfully with conservative Southerners and largely
accounts for the strength of the conservative coalition in the South. Thus,
racial fear and antagonism not only explain the breakdown of the liberal
coalition but the formation of a conservative coalition as well.' This is
best understood by briefly examining the dynamics of race and politics in
the American South, and the ways Republicans masterfully exploited these
dynamics to their advantage.
To begin with, it is important to remember that as Blacks were
registering to vote by the thousands in the late-1960s, they overwhelmingly
joined the party whose leaders had supported their cause-the party of
Roosevelt, Truman, Johnson, and the Kennedy boys-just as they had
joined, during the first Reconstruction of the 1860s, the party of Lincoln,
Sumner, and Stevens. This prompted a major political realignment among
the Southern white population from the Democratic party to the Republican
party. The Old South had been, on the whole, a one-party region. It
turned Democrat in the nineteenth century as a show of resistance, defiance,
and determination never to forget that shameful period where white men
stood with Negroes against other white men in what Radical Republicans
called a Reconstruction.47 Indications that Democratic presidents like
Roosevelt and Truman were responding to Northern Black concerns
prompted many Southern white Democrats to continue to vote Democratic
at the state and local levels, where their party could be kept lily white, but
not at the national level, where Blacks played a greater role in politics.
Meanwhile, millions of Blacks who had left the South between the first and
second Reconstructions to escape persecution and had settled in Northern
45. See JOHN MARTIN, THE DEEP SOUTH SAYS NEVER (1957); CARL ROWAN, Go SOUTH TO
SORROW (1957); JAMES SILVER, Mississippi: THE CLOSED SOCIETY (1963); BOB SMITH, THEY CLOSED
THEIR SCHOOLS: PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1951-64 (1965).
46. See Numan Bartley, The South and Sectionalism in American Politics, 3 J. POL. 38, at 239-57
(1976) (arguing that the presence and struggles of Blacks in the South have profoundly shaped Southern
white identity).
47. To better understand these sensibilities, see CLEMENT EATON, A HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN
CONFEDERACY (1954); ESSAYS IN SOUTHERN HISTORY (Fletcher M. Green ed., 1949); I.A. NEWBY, THE
SOUTH: A HISTORY (1978).
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and Midwestern cities, voted and even played a pivotal part in elections at
the national level.
As the Democratic Party got Blacker, then, the Republican Party got
whiter.48 Throughout a region often referred to as the Bible Belt, many
of these converts to the Republican Party were also religious conservatives
who possessed the kind of evangelical zeal which, if harnessed by
politicians, could put the South even more firmly in the Republican back
pocket. The creation by conservative whites in the South of their own
racially exclusive parties to oppose an increasingly integrated Democratic
party sent a clear message to the politically ambitious hoping to displace
Democrats from power. Republicans heard this message loud and clear in
the late-1950s and capitalized on it to their great benefit, controlling the
White House for five of the next seven presidential terms. They realized
the potential of controlling the House and Senate as well. As early as
1964, a year after the Birmingham civil rights demonstrations, Birming-
ham's congressional district elected John Buchanan to the House of
Representatives as part of the Goldwater faction of Republicans seeking
office throughout the country.49 Buchanan was thought to be part of an
"emerging new Republican majority sweeping the Old South in the mid-
1960s ... white, conservative, and part of the backlash against the civil
rights movement.,
50
Buchanan was a Baptist minister who had a consistently conservative
record. He voted to remove the restrictions on bombing targets in North
Vietnam, proposed a constitutional amendment to permit voluntary prayers
in school, and stood by Nixon to the very end. By 1980 he showed some
signs of changing with the times, moderating his views on women by
supporting the E.R.A., and on Blacks, who comprised a third of his district
and who demanded accountability. In 1980, however, he lost the primary
to a candidate backed by the Moral Majority. Ironically, the Goldwater
conservative was too liberal to pass the litmus test of the Moral Majority,
now a key player in the new conservative coalition of conservative
Christians and conservative Republicans.
48. See Paul A. Beck, Partisan Dealignment in the Postwar South, 71 AMER. POL. SC. REV. 477
(1977) (attributing realignment to tendency of young native whites to bring partisan loyalties and racial
attitudes in alignment under the National Republican banner); Bruce A. Campbell, Patterns of Change
in the Partisan Loyalties of Native Southerners: 1952-1972, 3 J. POL. 39, at 730-61 (1977) (showing
how Southern whites in the 1960s moved toward the Republican Party because that party more
accurately reflected their attitudes on integration and the expanding power of the federal government
in the area of race relations).
49. See Susan Welch & Buster Brown, Correlates of Southern Republican Success at the
Congressional District Level, 59 SOC. So. Q. 732 (1979) (showing that Republican victories and other
political developments in Mississippi were taking place throughout the South during the period, 1950-
1976).
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At the same time that Buchanan was campaigning for office in 1964 in
the deep South, as part of the anti-civil-rights backlash, there were political
developments taking shape out West that were of no less consequence for
the imminent merger of the Republican and Christian right. In 1966, only
one year after the passage of the Voting Rights Act and the Black uprising
in Watts, Los Angeles, a retired Hollywood actor was elected governor of
California. His masterful use of the media had made him a star first in the
world of entertainment, then in the world of corporate promotions, and
finally in the world of politics. Ronald Wilson Reagan campaigned on a
political platform that was anti-busing, antitax, anticommunism, and pro-
law-and-order, positions that resonated with significant segments of the
voting public in the wake of the Watts uprising and the antiwar protests of
students at Berkeley. California would be Reagan's experimental
laboratory for putting together a package of reactionary programs neatly
wrapped in God, Country, and Family. With the guidance of his image-
making consultants, Spencer-Roberts and Associates, he would make a
reactionary agenda appear moderate and a liberal agenda appear radical.
Reagan's apparently affable, genteel, grandfatherly manner was the perfect
bow to sit atop the package that would in November, 1980 be triumphantly
presented to the American public, just in time for Christmas.
The emerging conservative backlash was thus evident everywhere by the
time King was assassinated in 1968. Two months later, while the nation
was still mourning his death, Bobby Kennedy was gunned down during his
Presidential campaign. Vice President Hubert Humphrey went on to lose
to Nixon, who had quickly shed his old skin of moderate Republicanism
in order to appease conservative Southerners, without whom Republicans
stood little chance of recapturing the White House. Nixon's opposition to
forced busing, forced integration, quotas, welfare recipients, and rioters,
sent a clear message that the counterrevolution was in full stride.5
So then, by 1973, the racial backlash against the gains of the Civil
Rights movement was in place, the lines drawn, and the Republican road
map to success on the national political front well established. Much of the
Southern religious right had already crossed over to the Southern political
right, the Republican Party, by the time Roe was decided in 1973. When
conservative Christians reacted to the case, the Republican Party gladly
supported the position, lest they lose a pivotal region of voters they needed
to reclaim the White House after the disaster of Watergate. It is important
51. HODGSON, supra note 22, at 423-24 contends:
Nixon and Mitchell believed that ... few average Americans would base their political choice on
desire to improve their economic lot. Instead, they were betting that, for the majority of the
voters, the highest priority was to save the nation from hippies and black power militants, from
drug addicts and welfare mothers... . The Nixon administration made campaigning against those
four categories of people its highest policy priority.
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to note that conservative Christians were on the whole anti-Roe, anti-civil-
rights and, by implication, anti-Black-progress as well. After all, they
started voting for Republicans like Buchanan, Goldwater, and Nixon for
that very reason.
In summary, the merger between conservative Republicans and
conservative Christians was already underway before the 1973 decision of
Roe. Given the sentiment against Blacks, civil rights, and federal
government among conservative whites in the South, the merger made
perfect sense. Republicans needed a strong South to inaugurate a
counterrevolution against the redistributive agenda of the Democratic Party.
Religion was merely a way of mobilizing those needed voters who had
given up on politics and were patiently awaiting Jesus's return. They did
not get Jesus, but they got what many considered the next best thing, a
long succession of Republican candidates and officials who pampered them
and quoted their manifesto, the Bible. These politicians reflected and
invented a Republican identity that gave Southern conservatives a political
home and tapped their human yearning to belong to a community, a group
that respects and validates one's existence. Unfortunately, the conception
of community manufactured by Republican image-makers was a far cry
from the "Beloved Community" King had envisioned. Like all reactionary
community rhetorics and ideologies, it reflected the hopes, fears, and
phobias of the community to the outside world.
The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 must have seemed like the
Second Coming, the Kingdom of God brought finally to earth by a
counterrevolutionary movement that had been steadily building since the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown twenty-six years earlier. Ironically, the
kingdom turned out to be a Calvinistic kingdom of the elect, excluding
many who had, with great faith, labored in the vineyard and believed they
too would be saved. These outcasts were the conservative white supporters
of low and moderate income who had helped bring Reagan into office but
who were hurt by a counterrevolutionary agenda that took money from the
poor and gave it to the rich through the overhaul of New Deal social
programs, the deregulation of the economy, and the tripling of the federal
debt.
III. RACE, RELIGION, AND LIBERALISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS
The history of the relationship among religion, politics, and civil rights
over the last forty years thus demonstrates that Carter's emphasis on Roe
is overstated. This same history also reveals his inability to see that the
reunion of religion and liberalism will necessitate a fresh look at the role
of race in the historic split between religious and liberal discourse. Such
a fresh look requires a reconceptualization of liberalism's understanding of
race as much as its understanding of religion.
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Given Carter's earlier critique of affirmative action, this reconceptualiza-
tion does not seem likely. 2 In the case of affirmative action, Carter
accepts the traditional liberal position that forbids us from acting publicly
on "irrational" beliefs based on racial distinctions. To so act would be
irrational because liberalism conceives of the individual not as a racial or
ethnic being but as a rationally self-interested and autonomous being
abstracted from any historical and cultural context. To think of individuals
in racial or ethnic terms, ascribing to them attributes of groups, is to
display irrational thinking.
If liberals are to negotiate a rapprochement with religion, they must
admit two crucial points. First, the relationship between politics and
religion among the liberals of which Carter is so enamored, was, at least
in the Civil Rights era, almost the exclusive province of Black religious
leaders and their followers. As Black Civil Rights leaders continued to
come out of the Black Church, they, like King, continued to bring with
them the rhythms, verse, and vision, the prophetic hope, and the faith and
love engendered by this rich religious tradition. In a sense, then,
conservative Christians did not take religion from the left. Instead, the
white liberal left encountered the limits of liberal ideology and was
unwilling to struggle beyond those limits to secure a radically different
conception of community-such as those envisioned by either Black Power
advocates or King.
The liberal ideology that accommodated the freedom struggle up to the
signing of the Voting Rights Act could not accommodate, for many white
liberals, some of the answers that Black Power advocates were giving to
the question of "Where do we go from here? Black consciousness, as
opposed to colorblind consciousness; violence, as opposed to nonviolent
protest and reasoned deliberation; and agendas of cultural, political, and
economic independence, as opposed to integration, struck many white and
Black liberals as retrograde and illiberal. Nor could these liberals support
the direction in which King was moving at the end of his life. Many of
these liberals were faithful supporters of Johnson, and thus King's stand
against Vietnam alienated them. Many were pro-capitalism, and thus his
stand on wealth redistribution and democratic control over the means of
production alienated them. Finally, while many liberals would fight for a
colorblind society, they abhorred race-conscious remedies-such as racial
quotas and preferential treatment-to the unfinished agenda of poverty and
lack of opportunity. Thus, King's concessions to the demands of Black
Power advocates alienated white liberals.
This argument shows the central weakness in Carter's analysis. The real
problem is not the schism between liberals and religionists engendered by
52. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991).
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the Supreme Court's abortion decision in 1973 or even the schism between
religious discourse and philosophical liberalism. Rather, it is an ideological
and racial schism engendered by the counterrevolution inaugurated with the
merger of conservative Christians and conservative Republicans determined
to repeal the gains of the 1950s and 1960s. If liberals desire a reconcilia-
tion with those who take religion seriously, they will need to recommit to
a struggle of completing the unfinished work of the Freedom Movement of
the 1960s. Otherwise, the use of religion in public space is likely to
continue to be no more than rhetorical tokenism.
Religion is taken seriously by those who see evil in the world and are
determined to eradicate it. The marriage of conservative Republicans and
conservative Christians was a lasting one because they were committed to
a counterrevolutionary political agenda that brought people together, gave
them something for which to live and for which to fight. King attempted
to do the same toward the end of his life by creating a broader coalition
that specifically addressed the problems of continued racism, the uneven
distribution of wealth and power, and American imperialism's drain on
economic and spiritual resources.
The trivialization of religion in American culture is not so much, then,
a problem of the ideological limits of liberalism as it is a problem of the
limits of moral conviction and political will to face the unfinished work
ahead. If that work is ever taken seriously, the integrity of the struggle will
build a bridge between secularists and religionists, who, while they may
speak different languages, will experience those rarest of moments when
one sees into the soul of another and knows Truth.
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